AWESOME !

Türk Askerlerinden Kimse Korece Ve İngilizce Bilmemesinden Dolayı Amerikan Ordusu Türkçe Bilen Ermeni Tercümanlar Tutmuştu.

Koreli Gazi Albay Kwang J. Yang Olayı Şöyle Anlattı ; ´´Çin Ordusunun Taaruzu Sırasında Amerikan Ordusu Ve Birleşmiş Milletler Ordusu Tercümanların Uyarısıyla Pusan Ve Suvan Cephelerine Geri Çekilmişti.
Fakat Birleşmiş Milletler Ordusu Çekildiği Sırada Ermeni Tercümanlar Türk Ordusuna Haber Vermedi´´

Türkler 5.000 Kişilik Güç İle 500.000 Bin Çin Ordusuyla Karşı Karşıya Kaldı.
29 Kasım Günü Mermileri Biten Türk Ordusu Kılıç Ve Süngüleriyle Hatta Bir Ara Yumruklarıyla Çinli Askerleri Harap Ettiklerini Ve Çemberi Yarmayı Başardıkları Ortaya Çıktı.

Koreli Gazilere Göre Etrafları Sarılmış Olmasına Rağmen 2.400 Kişinin Çemberi Yarmayı Başardığını Geriye Kalan Türk Askerinin İse Esir Düştüğünü Ve Şehit Edildiğini Söyledi.

Koltuk Generali blogdan alıntıdır...

Emekli Yarbay Anthony Herbert, Amerika´nın en tanınmış savaş kahramanlarından birisidir. Kore Savaşı patlak verdiğinde, orduya katılmılştır. Kunuri´de ilk büyük Çin taarruzu sırasında geri çekilen kendi birliği tarafından, Türk Tugayı´na irtibat görevlisi olarak verilmiştir. Kuşatılan ve yokolma tehlikesiyle karşılaşan Türk birliğiyle beraber kuşatmayı yarmak için mücadele etmiştir. Kunuri´de Türk askeriyle birlikte verdiği mücadeleden ötürü, sonradan Türk Ordusu tarafından madalya ile ödüllendirilmiştir. Kore Savaşı´nı, savaşın en çok madalya kazanan askeri olarak tamamlamıştır. Vietnam Savaşı´nda da görev almış ve Yarbay rütbesine yükselerek tabur komutanı olmuştur. Vietnam Savaşı sırasında gösterdiği başarılarla adı Amerikan halkı tarafından daha fazla duyulmuş ve bir savaş kahramanı haline gelmiştir. 1973 yılında Soldier isimli kitabında anılarını anlatmış ve anılarında Amerikan Ordusu´nun Vietnam´da işlediği insanlık suçlarından bahsetmiştir. Anılarıyla birçok Amerikalı´nın tepkisini çekmiş olsa da, o bugün hala bir kahraman olarak anılır.


İşte, parlak bir askeri kariyere sahip olan Herbert, henüz genç bir askerken, 1950 yılının soğuk bir Kasım günü, Kunuri bölgesinde etrafı kuşatılmış bir Türk bölüğüyle birlikte yaşadıklarını anılarında anlatmıştır. Aşağıda anlatılanlar, "Türk askeri nasıl savaşır?" sorusuna, bir Amerikalı´nın verdiği cevaptır.



Türkler bir bölük kadardılar. Bulunduğumuz tepe üzerine mevzilerimizi hazırladık ve gelecek emirleri beklemeye koyulduk. Ben Türkçe bilmiyordum ve onlardan da İngilizce konuşan kimse yoktu. Böylece sessiz ve soğuk bir gece geçirdik. Ertesi sabah kendimizi Çinliler tarafından kuşatılmış halde bulduk. Gergindim. Hiç savaş tecrübesi olmayan bir birlikle beraberdim ve onlarla konuşamıyordum. Onlar ise daha mutlu olamazlardı. Oturup piknik yaptılar. Ne tarafa baksalar, düşman vardı. Hangi tarafa ateş etseler Çinlileri öldürebilirlerdi. Onlar da, tüm sabahı Çinlileri öldürerek geçirdiler. Ben ise, bir kenarda oturmuş, buradan nasıl çıkacağımızın planlarını yapıyordum. Güneş yükseldiğinde herkesin cephanesi iyice azalmıştı ama Türkler yine de inanılmaz derecede sakindiler. Bir avcı zinciri oluşturdular, süngülerini taktılar ve sırıtarak yüzlerini kuzeye döndüler. Döndükleri yönü gördüm ve anında anladım ki, gitmek istediğim yön orası değildi. Ayağa fırladım ve yumruğumu güneye doğru savurmaya başladım. Türklerin oluşturduğu muharebe hattı güneye doğru çark etti ve birden kendimi tüm Kore Savaşı içerisinde gördüğüm en mükemmel eski usül süngü hücumunun içinde buldum. Buradan şu dersi çıkardım: Türkler asla tuzağa düşürülemez. Başı belada olan kişiler, onları kuşatanlardır. O gün, onları süngülerini kullanırken görmek ilham vericiydi. Onlar birer dervişti. Sıradışı bir teknikleri vardı ve bize Fort Benning´de(Amerikan Piyade Okulu) öğrettikleri gibi değildi. Düşmanın üzerine atlıyorlar, süngüyü düşmanın karnına sokuyorlar, etraflarında dönüyor ve tüfeğin kabzasına sol elleriyle bastırarak düşmanın bağırsaklarını deşiyorlardı. O güne dair, en canlı şekilde hatırladığım şey ise, o hücumu izlerken Tanrı´ya veya Birleşmiş Milletler´e veya Türkler´in bizim yanımızda savaşmasına sebep olan her kimse, o kişiye karşı duyduğum minnet duygusudur.
Anthony Herbert - Soldier

Translation of the paragraph above from Anthony Herbert´s book SOLDIER

"The Turks were of about a company size. We established a perimeter on our hill and sat back to wait for some further word. I didn´t speak their language and nobody in their group spoke English, so we spent a cold, quiet night and the next morning found ourselves surrounder by Chinese. I was nervous. There I was with a unit that had never been in combat before, we were surrounded and I couldn´t even talk tothem. They couldn´t have been happier. They were having a picnic. Every way they looked, it was the front. They could fire in any direction and kill Chinese. They used up most of the morning doing just that, whle I sat around trying to figure out how I could get the hell out of there. By the time the sun was high, everybody´s ammo was low, but the Turks were calm as hell about it. They formed a skirmish line, fixed their bayonets and faced north with grins on their faces. I saw the direction they were facing and knew instantly it wasn´t where I wanted to go. I jumped up and jammed my fist to the south. Their line whirled, and I suddenly found myself swept along in one of the most sucessful, old fashioned bayonet charges of the entire Korean War. I learned a lesson from that. The Turks are never trapped. It´s the people who surround them who are in trouble. Watching them use their bayonets that day was a revelation They were dervishes. They had a peculiar style--one I hadn´t learned back at Benning. They lunged, drove the bayonet into the abdomen, whirled, struck down hard on top of the rifle with their with their left hand and consequently disembowled their victims. My most vivid memory of that charge is of my gratitude to God or the United Nations or whoever was resposible for putting the Turks on our side."

Looks like the were not made to scale because they look to be much taller than the average turk  ,

Passage from a book I am reading.

By the sxith century, Turkish tribes had begun to cross the mountains from the semideserts of central Asia, invited as mercenaries in the pay of the Byzantine emperor. They were  nomadic tribes: even up to the time of the great invasions of the tenth century, they looked like Orientals.

When they came through the passes of the Caucasus Mountains, they were followed by their families and their flocks. and protected by their fine horsemen. Their pay as mercenaries was often land, so that when in the eleventh century, tribe after tribe of Turkish people gushed forth into Anatolia, they found that their own people had long been there, had intermarried with the native people, and no longer looked like them. They were beginning to look like the modern Turks, a mixture of Asian tribes and the indigenous people. Still short stout people but less of an Asian appearance.

This is the field of service, it is the Korean War memorial in Washington DC and like all the other War memorials in Washintong, it is very impressive to see

First IMO no army is impressive as it´s design is to kill, bully and overcome what is deemed not desireable, or to pillage kill and rape the land/country and people of the land.

In historical writings it is never totally truthful because each side will relish what they want and each side will lie. It is human trait to try to come out the best side. You will never hear a country say " oh yes it was stupid of us to enter that country and kill /rape and pillage it so that we could control it or take it for our own....... Same with religion fights there is always a side that thinks they are the right ones.

But for this particular photo, I am saying it is all wrong. Size of soldiers and also the uniform. As any person who has just come from the army ( Turkish duty ) and they will tell you they froze, the food was shitty and they had to buy extra clothing to stay dry/warm.

Here is insert from another book regarding  this particular event.

THE TURKS IN KOREA

The Turkish Brigade arrived at the port of Pousan on 18 October 1950 and it was officially titled “Turkish Armed Forces Command”. The brigade’s body, consisted of the 241st Infantry Regiment including three Infantry Battalions, one Field Artillery Battalion, a Signals Platoon, a Pioneer Company, a Transportation Company, a Medical Company and an Ordnance Company. There was a total force of 5,455 men. Brigadier General Tahsin Yazici was the Commanding Officer. On 1 September 1951, the Turkish Brigade was replaced for the first time, after a staying period of 10 months in Korea having a new CO Brigadier General Sirri Acar. Replacements took place also on 30 July 1952 and 4 September 1953, while the final departure took place in May 1954. Those replacements concern likely the brigade in its total, since it seems that it was replaced every time by a fresh one, coming from Turkey.

When the Turks arrived at Korea, were poorly equipped, since their equipment was outdated in its total. The soldiers were wearing the British “battle-dress” uniform that was recently adopted by the Turkish Army, heavy military overcoats, British Mk2 helmets and individual leather-made webbing of German origin. Before enter the fighting in November, they just managed to get equipped with modern US arms and standard US M1943 clothing, which was not issued immediately. Gradually, the Turkish clothing and equipment was replaced with US made and especially the brigades that arrived later in Korea were totally issued with US material and arms.

It is astonishing to observe that, the Turkish myth, starts as soon as the Turks arrived in Korea. It is true, that during their arrival they were given a lot of publicity for a number of reasons that have to do mostly with the observer’s psychology and aim. It has to be taken into account, that during that time, Turks were more or less unknown to the American people and even more concerning their fighting skills. The Turkish Army had not fought since 1922, so an average observer, could form an opinion only through a rough review of its history. The fatal influence of the Ottoman Empire history and also from the First World War formed a picture of a “capable” and “brave” army with tough reputation. But this reputation is based mainly on slaughters and genocide’s of civilians or paramilitary formations, for which Turks are notorious to their neighbors. A third party observer who has not made further studies can not have a direct perception and naturally forms a wrong picture. In this way we have the first evidence who led to the creation of the Turkish myth.

It is astonishing to observe that, the Turkish myth, starts as soon as the Turks arrived in Korea. It is true, that during their arrival they were given a lot of publicity for a number of reasons that have to do mostly with the observer’s psychology and aim. It has to be taken into account, that during that time, Turks were more or less unknown to the American people and even more concerning their fighting skills. The Turkish Army had not fought since 1922, so an average observer, could form an opinion only through a rough review of its history. The fatal influence of the Ottoman Empire history and also from the First World War formed a picture of a “capable” and “brave” army with tough reputation. But this reputation is based mainly on slaughters and genocide’s of civilians or paramilitary formations, for which Turks are notorious to their neighbors. A third party observer who has not made further studies can not have a direct perception and naturally forms a wrong picture. In this way we have the first evidence who led to the creation of the Turkish myth.

James Stokesbury, obviously influenced, describes: “Among the most prominent contributors, the Turks sent a much-respected infantry brigade, whose men were evidently uninterested in higher tactics or sophisticated military skills, but possessed much rugged courage and willingness to endure”.(3) There are also historical reports that generate specific questions concerning their subjective dimension and also the degree of altering and overestimating the meaning of simple everyday ethos or procedures of an army: “Turks were admired a lot for their unlimited toughness and resistance to the Chinese. The only traitor was silently murdered by his compatriots. When one of their men was sick, two of his colleagues were responsible for his survival”.(4)

A more realistic account of the truth, is given by the description of the Turkish image by Clay Blair: “The Turks, commanded by Brigadier General Tahsin Yazici, had arrived in Korea like the Marines, in a blaze of publicity. With their colorful, flowing mustaches, swarthly complexions, and fierce demeanors, they gave war correspondents and others the impression they were very tough soldiers. The reality was that they were ill trained, ill led, and green to combat”.(5)

Mike Michaelis, CO of the US 27th Infantry Regiment who fought in Korea, described in an elegant style the average Turkish soldier that arrived in Korea to fight: “The Turks were commanded by an aged brigadier who had been a division commander at Gallipoli in 1916 fighting the British! He was highly respected, high up in the Turkish military establishment, and took a bust to brigadier to command the brigade. The average Turk soldier in the brigade came from the steppe country of Turkey, near Russia, had probably had only three or four years of school, was uprooted, moved to western Turkey, given a uniform, [a] rifle, and a little smattering of training, stuck on a ship, sailed ten thousand miles, then dumped off on a peninsula – ‘Korea, where’s that?’ – and told the enemy was up there someplace, go get him! The Turk soldier scratches his head and says, ‘What’s he done to me?’”(6)

The problem that the Allies would face with the Turks was easily understood having them arriving in Korea. Only a few of them, mainly officers were speaking English, while on the other hand no American was speaking Turkish. Therefore, the level of contact and communication between the Turkish Brigade and the IX Army Corps Headquarters where it was attached, was particularly poor up to non-existing, at least during the first stages.

CRASHING IN THE FIRST BATTLE

Arriving in Korea the Turkish Brigade was attached to the US 25th Infantry Division of the IX Army Corps of the Eight Army. Its entering in battle was performed by stages, as it was provided for a newly arrived unit to the battlefield. By the end of November 1950, the Turks were based near the town of Kounou-ri, acting as reserve of the IX Army Corps. On 25 November, while the Allies had launched an attack that seemed to progress well, the enemy launches an unexpected general counterattack. Around 250,000 Chinese are poured out towards the South, having as a result to break the defense of the South Korean II Army Corps. In this way the right flank of the Eight Army was in serious danger and threatened by getting surrounded. The Allied forces had to retreat.

Among the actions that the leadership decided to perform, was the assignment of the operational zone of the South Korean II Army Corps to the US IX Army Corps in order to ensure the integrity of the right flank of the Eight Army and decelerate the enemy’s charge. At this point the Turkish Brigade was ordered to attack to the east towards the town of Tokcon.

Brigadier Yazici ordered one of his battalions to move towards the town, but while it was on the way, there were information according to which large enemy forces were moving towards Tokcon. The IX Army Corps CO Lieutenant General John Coulter ordered the Turkish battalion to stop at a road near the village of Wawon, to prepare defense positions and stay with them. Believing that Coulter had ordered the battalion to return where it came from, Brigadier Yazici gave the order having as a result to leave the right flank of the Eight Army completely exposed. But the Turkish mistakes continued. Returning to Wawon, they attacked hundreds of soldiers that where moving south and captured 125 prisoners. They would later find out that the poor guys they slaughtered were... furious South Korean soldiers of the II Army Corps that were retreating.  

Even so, this first miserable Turkish action was promoted and positively commented worldwide. Robert Leckie clarifies in a straight manner the purpose for which that Turkish “victory” was treated with so much publicity: “The Turks moved out, and then, after reaching the village of Wawon about seven miles east, were brought to the battle which American newsmen, eager for a victory to report (especially, it seems, if it could be about those “Terrible Turks” of whom Americans knew so little), proclaimed around the globe. No small fight ever won more impressive headlines around the world. The word was flashed that the Turks, meeting the Chinese for the first time, had dealt them a bloody repulse at bayonet point; it was the first stirring bit of news from the November battle. But what precisely happened in the first few hours at Wawon is still an open question. The brigade also boasted the capture of several hundred enemy prisoners from among these first “Chinese” waves. The word gave a lift to the neighbors. Lt. Sukio Oji, a Nisei interpreter, was sent by the 2^nd Division to interview the prisoners. Instead of Chinese, he found 200 forlorn ROKs who had blundered into the Turkish column while beating their way back from the fight at Tokcon”.(7)

In the official Hellenic Army General Staff History “The Hellenic Expeditionary Force in Korea 1950-55” it is mentioned for the incidents of those days: “On the 27th of November 1950 the Turkish Brigade acting as a reserve was involved for the first time in the fighting in the area of Wawon – Kounou-Ri, Southeast of the town of Tokcon. After attacking against the retreating South Korean allies, it faced the Chinese Communists and was scattered with heavy casualties and only fighting groups of Turks managed to escape”.(8)

Raymond Cartier is more caustic, describing the facts with an undisguised ironical manner: “For the Turks is their first appearance they make in Korea. It was preceded by a bright reputation for their bravery, and even for their fierceness. The first news from their battles are shaking the press offices of the American newspapers. The Turks assaulted using the bayonets, they created a massacre and arrested hundreds of prisoners... Their only mistake is that they picked up the wrong enemy: They considered as Chinese the South Koreans that were retreating. When they meet the real Chinese is their turn to get slaughtered. The remaining of the brigade took refuge at the positions of the 38th Infantry Regiment”.(9)

The first contact of the Turkish Brigade with the face of war proved to be disastrous. Those first incidents with the Turks, revealed that further on the cooperation with them would prove to be extremely difficult and for this reason a stronger contact and a stricter control had to be established. Nevertheless this did not take place right away, due to the fact that the myth had already been created and would follow the Turks ever since. No one seemed to take seriously into account these first signs of incompetence. Clay Blair notes with clarity: “Like the war correspondents, Coulter apparently was mesmerized by the Turks and continued to regard them as superhuman fighters rather than the poorly led green troops that they were. Coulter’s misplaced confidence in the Turks led to disastrous consequences”.(1

The Allied forces had to retreat fighting hard. The Turkish Brigade had taken defense positions at Wawon closing the gap between sections of the 2^nd Infantry Brigade and other formations. This gap was of vital importance, because if the enemy burst the defense at that point, the 2^nd Brigade would be cut-off at Kounou-ri. Soon enough the Turks underwent a fierce attack and the unit commanders ordered their men to fix bayonets and counterattack. This determined reaction, maybe was based on the effort to find a way to rinse the shame that the Turks probably felt, from the so far bad presence in the battlefield. But even this action did not prove to be effective. Essentially the famous Turkish Brigade dissolved once more.

For one more time, even this new disaster was surrounded with a heroically overcoat, the so beloved for the American reporters, up to the point to be known as an example to follow! According to the new fairytale, the Turks were reported to have killed up to 200 enemy soldiers! Even so truth can not be hidden in history. Clay Blair reports: “But the truth was that these overrated, poorly led green troops broke and bugged out, again leaving the entire right flank of Eight Army exposed”.(11)

For the same battle incidents, Paul Freeman was later commenting, in a clearly sarcastic way, that the Turks “look at the situation, and they had no stomach for it, and they were running in all directions”.(12)

The chaotic situation at the right flank of the Eight Army, caused a new retreat, while the 24^th Brigade was ordered to hurry in order to reinforce the 2^nd Brigade. The sensitive maneuvers required were performed in a cool and effective way and the Eight Army continued its retreat. The Turkish Brigade along with the South Korean 3^rd Regiment and the US 2^nd and 25^th Infantry Divisions, initiated their retreat through Kounou-ri towards Sountchon. Nevertheless Kounou-ri, as the strong point of the retrograde maneuver, was of vital importance and the 2^nd Division was ordered to hold on until the rest of the forces move towards south. As the next step, the 2^nd Brigade would withdraw towards Sountchon choosing a route. A straight path towards Sountchon was finally selected, using a road among hills going through a deep ditch leading to the valley of Tsentong river. Using this path would anyway allow the support of the 27^th British Brigade and the Turkish Brigade which nevertheless had already disestablished.

The 9^th and 23^rd Regiments of the US 2^nd Infantry Division, were prepared on the left, the South Korean 3^rd Regiment at the center and the Turks on the right. While on the left the 25^th Division was retreating in a sense of panic in the night of 29 November the 2^nd Division would try to hold on to their positions. Unfortunately the whole effort was degenerated, due to the breakdown and the rout (once more) of the Turkish Brigade, in combination with the heavy casualties that the rest of the units suffered. The only unit that could be considered capable of fighting, was the 23^rd Regiment, while until late in the evening, the strength of the 9^th and 38^th Regiments had dropped to 600 exhausted men. The Chinese 133^rd Division had breached the Turkish lines and without being noticed, two of its regiments started to prepare on the side of the road towards Sountchon, from where the 2^nd Division would initiate its retreat, covering it with heavy weapons, machine guns and mortars.

The Turkish Brigade undertook the night task to move to the north, which was performed in a sense of uncertainty and without having knowledge for what was happening around. Parts of the Turkish Brigade were engaged in fights and were soon disorganized and in the North Korean and Chinese lines a rumor was spread talking about the captivity of prisoners that did not speak English. Around 07.35, in the morning of 30 November, Turkish forces coming from Sountchon, were ambushed 30 miles away from Kounou-ri. The ambush was set up by the Chinese 2^nd Regiment, under the command of Colonel Yang Sixian, that had marched for 40kms, reaching a point, 3kms away from the mountain road to Kounou-ri. Around midnight, the Chinese had moved following a path and took positions on a number of hills controlling the road. The convoy of 40 trucks with American drivers, was placed under heavy fire. The Turks were escaping surprised, firing in every direction or jumping into ditches. Some brave tried to counterattack towards the hills, but did not reach far. Half of the trucks were halted in the road, while the rest were placed off, heading towards Kounou-ri, to be attacked by other Chinese units. Within a short period the Turkish force had been decimated. The Chinese medical orderly assisted the lightly injured carrying them to lee locations, while on the other hand abandoned the heavily injured for which they could not help. Cold would kill them soon. After they collected selected armament, food and ammunition, the Chinese left the scene of massacre. Major Ma, a Harbin Muslim and executive officer of the 2^nd Battalion, heard a wounded spelling the word “dousman” before he died. “These soldiers are Turks” he said to his commander. “Dousman means enemy”.

Lacking a translator, the Turks that survived could not provide a clear picture of the size of the Chinese threat. Teams of the US Military Police sent to check it out, never returned back. Later on a reconnaissance tank company of M4 Shermans passed by the position of the destroyed convoy, without receiving fire, but not lost time to check for Turkish survivors. Nevertheless the description given by Russell Spurr for this disaster, could not avoid the heroic tone: “The Turkish Brigade fought magnificently. Officers threw their caps on the ground and swore to stand or die. But the Turks were engulfed by the advancing Chinese. Their brigade ceased to exist as a fighting force. A few units managed to back their way out and escape across the hills”.(13) Official history accounts report the assignments given to each unit, in an effort to clear the road to Sountchon. The Turkish Brigade did not show up at all which means that during the dramatic night of 29/30 November the core of its manpower had been dismantled.

While the 9^th Regiment using its 2^nd and 3^rd Battalions would lead the attack to the blocks set up by the Chinese on the road, only two Turkish companies were provided to the 3^rd Battalion as a reinforcement. In the beginning the South Korean 3^rd Regiment undertook the mopping up of the hills overlooking the road, in order to unblock the retreating route of the 2^nd Division. The 9^th Regiment’s CO underestimated the Chinese resistance and having the 2^nd Regiment leading (the two Turkish companies were following along with the 3^rd Battalion followed by the 1^st Battalion) moved on the road, using every available weapon to return the Chinese fire. At the location of the destroyed Turkish convoy, the Sherman’s stopped in order to clear the road from the burnt vehicles. A wounded whispered: “Me Turk! Me Turk!” and then the Americans understood that the Chinese held these positions for at least a day and that they were trapped! Scared soldiers fired with their weapons towards every direction, tanks were firing the stopped vehicles in order to clear the road, dead and wounded were accumulating at the side ditches. Facing heavy casualties and an unforgettable experience from the hell they lived, the 2^nd Division cleared the way.

Until 2 December, the retreat of the Eight Army had been completed. The 2^nd Division does not exist anymore and the Turkish Brigade lies completely disorganized, having lost 1/5 of its manpower, approximately 1,000 men, of whom more than 400 KIAs! After facing reorganization, the Brigade was attached to the 25^th Division, which along with three other Brigades undertook the defense of Line B, in the area of Imjin river.

The enemy had limited its activity since the middle of December, when the Eight Army had withdrawn south of the 38th Parallel. Nevertheless it is outraging the fact that despite the totally negative performance of the Turks, not only the war correspondents but also the military chain of command, continued to have the impression that these Asians were just bad in defense but good in attack! Having been tested in both cases, everyone should have understood that the Turks were not good in any kind of fighting. This did not stop the US command to set up verbal orders for using the “foreign” Allied forces according to their talent. Therefore for example the British that had verified that were hesitant in attack but capable in defense, were ordered to be used defensively, while the Turkish Brigade... offensively.

On the New Year’s day of 1951, the Chinese performed their third large scale attack, trying to pass the 38th Parallel. At the west sector of the Allied defense line, the enemy did not attack heavily, since the defense there was strong. But generally in the central sector, the South Korean resistance was overcomed and the Allies were forced to a general withdrawal towards the beachhead of Seoul.

On the left flank of the west sector, the Turkish Brigade along with the 25^th Division headed to Seoul, at whose perimeter were established until the morning of 2 January 1951. In order to prevent the Eight Army from being destroyed in an effort to defend this beachhead, its post quitting was decided the day after together with the withdrawal southern on Line C. To secure Line C, the Turkish Brigade withdrew at Kimpoyia airport to hang on to the left flank, while other units were placed properly. The enemy nevertheless managed to break the defense and on 4 January seized Seoul.

In order to push the enemy to the north and make him suffer as much casualties as possible, the Eight Army undertook by the end of January a counterattack codenamed THUNDERBOLT. On the left, the I Army Corps would march towards the south bank of Han river opposite Seoul in order to recapture Kimpo airport and Inchon, while on the right the IX Army Corps would follow. The I Army Corps attack would start with the 25^th Division. The division´s CO decided to attack from the left flank of his formation with the 35^th Regiment, but he could not choose the second regiment that would cover the right flank. He hesitated because the 27^th Regiment had recently performed an operation and was placed in reserve, while the 24^th Regiment was proved to be of low battle-worthiness. Facing this situation, the Divisional CO chose to replace the 24^th Regiment with the Turkish Brigade.

The attack was launched on 25 January showing slow progress, not because of enemy resistance since the main volume of the enemy forces had withdrawn, but due to the method with which the attacking forces were moving. The Turkish Brigade attacked in two columns, towards Kumyangjang and for the first time managed to stand in the battlefield. After extensive use of direct support artillery in which the Turkish Artillery Battalion participated, the Turks captured a hill north of Sougouon. Using fixed bayonets, they moved and captured the enemy positions.

This limited in scale, but in any way first, Turkish success, immediately received extraordinary dimensions. Everyone showed that have found the heroes they were looking for in order to raise the moral. Rumors said that the Turks killed 400 soldiers, most of them using bayonet! Right afterwards an investigation showed that on the hill there were only 154 bodies, the big majority of which were slaughtered by the artillery fire, that preceded.

This case, shows once more the extraordinary dimensions that the Americans tended to give every success of the Allied forces and especially to those caused by the action of “foreign” units. Let us not forget that many of the Allies had not fought for decades (like the Turks) while for others the not so flattering actions during World War II (French, Belgians, Dutch) were still recent. Despite all these, the influence from the rumors created for this heroic attack and the “slaughtering” of the enemy by the Turkish bayonet, was such that shows that if the rumors intended to psychologically influence the soldiers morale, then it proved absolutely successful. This was due to the fact that the new Eight Army CO General Matthew B. Ridgway, got full knowledge for the real facts and the excessive publicity that the Turkish attack underwent, he was smart enough to get impressed by the big impact that the created rumors caused. He decided to get full advantage of this, in order to strengthen the moral of his men. So he issued an order according to which all men in the Eight Army should fight onwards on fixed bayonets. According to a historian, “The command greatly needed something to symbolize the birth of a new spirit. Restoration of the bayonet, and a dramatizing of the action, was at one with the simple message given to the troops: “The job is to kill Chinese”. Once men could be persuaded that those in others units were deliberately seeking the hand-to-hand contest with the enemy, they would begin to feel themselves equal to the overall task. There can be no question about the efficacy of this magic in the particular situation: IT WORKED!”(14)

Therefore the truth could be totally hidden and everyone could be misled, by a short paragraph like the one of Harry Summers, concerning exactly that incident: “The brigade’s bayonet charge against Chinese positions in January 1951 led then EUSA Commander General Matthew B. Ridgway to order all infantry units on the line to fix bayonets on their rifles”.(15)

In the mean time, while the Allied attack was progressing slowly, the enemy concentrated stronger forces, showing increasing resistance and performing periodically stronger counterattacks. The Eight Army was ordered to continue the attack.

In “The Korean War 1950-53” it is mentioned that in February, exactly at the specific time period, the Turks “fought doggedly near Osan”.(16) The truth is that it was an effort of a few days period, in close coordination with other US forces, to occupy a hill. This is usual in a war and in any case the Turkish performance could not be but overestimated, since a more careful examination of the facts shows that during the final stages, the Turks were exhausted and they were just following the Americans.

The Turkish Brigade was ordered to attack and occupy in coordination with the US 35^th Regiment, the vital Hill 431 that was strongly occupied by the enemy. Under heavy artillery fire, the attack begun on 2 February and the troops managed to capture some ground. But the reaction of the enemy was strong and performing counterattacks repeatedly pushed the Turks away from the hill.

On 3 February, Ridgway ordered to stop the direct attack and forced to attack on the flanks. Indeed, the next two days the Turks and the 35^th Regiment acted according to the new order, always under heavy artillery support and captured the hill. Having the enemy exhausted from the continuous fight and the losses due to the artillery fire, US units continued the attack, leaving the Turkish Brigade to follow behind. The units were reinforced with tanks, distributed into platoons and moved facing resistance but there are no reports showing that the Turks undertook any noticeable action in these particular battles. The more likely, they had done everything to their power and now the initiative was totally in the hands of the Americans.

Despite the fierce resistance, the Chinese were forced to a general retreat in the mid of March and Seoul was recaptured. Nevertheless since April the Allies had obvious signs for the preparation of the Chinese for their fifth in the row large scale attack. On 22 April, nine Chinese Armies with 250,000 men attacked and the Eight Army started to implement the pre-arranged withdrawal move. It was the largest scale battle in the Korean War.

In the sector of the US I Army Corps, on the line of contact there was the Porto Rican 65^th Regiment, reinforced with a Philippines Battalion and on the right, the Turkish Brigade, a total force of 10,000 men, from which more than 5,000 Turks. At that point more than 50,000 Chinese attacked having as a result a chaotic battlefield. The Turks were not late to confirm their real reputation. At the moment when their CO was on leave to Japan, his formation was crashing.

The Chinese attack broke into the night, along the whole Turkish front and until 09.00 am, the Turkish 5^th, 7^th and 9^th Companies had been surrounded. The 1^st Company that was in reserve 3,000 yards behind, was fighting in order to avoid its envelopment. At 11.00 am the Turkish commander reported that all his companies were surrounded except two and after permission requested and given, moved his Headquarters south of river Hantan. The Turks managed to escape, together with their Artillery Battalion and gathered south of river Hantan in a safe place.

In order to close the gap that the Turks had left behind, the US 35^th Regiment was ordered to harry, while the 24^th Regiment on the right of the Turkish positions, was forced to retreat. The CO of the Porto Rican 65^th Regiment later on expressed, using obviously disparaging words, his opinion for the Turkish presence in the battle: “On our left flank we had that reliable, unflappable British Brigade and they really caught hell. [On our right] the Turkish Brigade had fallen back some ten or twelve miles. […] As long as the Turks were on the offensive and the Chinese were running, the Turks were pretty good. But when the going was tough, they were hard to find”.(17)

Until the end of the hostilities, the Turkish Brigade did not participated in any major operation, acting only as a reserve force.

Around the end of May 1953, the Chinese initiated a series of attacks forming their last attack which lasted until the signing of the final cease fire agreement. The first attack broke out in the zone of the IX Army Corps, which held its positions causing significant losses to the enemy. The Chinese tried again in the operational zone of the I Army Corps and more specifically in five outposts of the Turkish Brigade, which now lied under the command of the US 25^th Division. The fight was hard and the Turks were engaged in hand to hand fighting. Despite that they were instantly faltered and retreated, they counterattacked and managed to recapture two of the positions, where they repositioned themselves. During the battles of that day, the Chinese suffered heavy casualties, while the Turks had 104 killed and 367 wounded.

This successful resistance of the Turks, could be explained in many ways. First of all it was the third in the row brigade arriving in Korea and was already there for a period of eight months. Therefore, it had been completely accustomed to the war environment and face, while it had all the time needed to fill the gaps existing when arriving from Turkey. As a result, even this average Turkish performance had serious excuses to be explained.

In general, everyone and especially the Americans, were always overestimating the Turks as soldiers in the Korean War and many times they were presenting examples with which they tried to excuse the reputation of the “tough” Turk, that were funny and could easily be overturned.

Such a completely unfortunate example, is the indirect but obviously flattering comment for the Turks, made by Max Hastings: “When 21 Americans had been successfully Communist indoctrinated, not a single Turkish prisoner of war had succumbed”.(18) It is a totally superficial consideration which concludes to the derivation of a gross and arbitrary conclusion. This is because it ignores the biggest problem the Turks faced with their allies. While the Americans themselves could not communicate with the Turks, how was it possible for the Chinese to communicate with them and also to submit them to a methodical program of communistic propaganda? The whole case sounds hilarious.

There is also the description of an American that found himself in the same concentration camp with Turkish prisoners. Describing his impression form a Turkish soldier named Nafi, he mentions: “…a private soldier who had been such a powerful influence amongst his compatriots in the Turkish soldier’s company at Pyoktong, that the Chinese had believed him to be an officer. Fortunately, they were still not sure about his rank; they had no efficient Turkish interpreter in Korea”.(19)  

COMPARISON WITH THE GREEKS IN KOREA

From what has already been mentioned, one can easily conclude what is often lost in the depth of history. That behind big words and official statements, lies the political expediency and the support of an aim. So even in Korea, the Americans wished to raise in the eyes of public their Allies, contributing with forces to the Korean War. Not forgetting that most of the army units were coming from countries that already were, or were to become NATO members and it had to be shown that (especially to the new allies such as the Turks) were considered to be equal. They also had to find ways, as it was understood, to maintain and elevate the morale through the cultivation of a spirit of noble competition, among the Allied forces, based on the strong socle of anticommunism. The reports from people that participated in the Korean War, with respect to the level of morale of the Allies, indicate that the picture attributed by the novelistic and epic style of books, had nothing to do with the hard reality. Despite this, today the foreign veterans are giving easily the titles of “fearless” and “the toughest” to their Turkish comrades in arms; more a move of sympathy for the poor and clumsy Turks that suffered heavily than justified words.

From all these, someone could suppose that in the same way, that the positive comments attributed to the Hellenic Expeditionary Force (HEF) to Korea, was no more as in the case of the Turkish Brigade than “exaggerations”. Such a thought, is wrong. This is because while the Greek participation was 1/5 the size of the Turkish one, the HEF detached an overwhelming majority of appraisals and distinctions in comparison with the Turks. It is only that a brigade is naturally more easily “distinguished” than a battalion. The positive comments for the Hellenic presence in the battlefield were genuine, since it corresponded to the truth. This is due to the fact that the Hellenic Army was already fighting for a decade, the officers were excellent leaders and there was a more recent experience during the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), in full contradiction with the “smokeless” for decades Turks.

The HEF, basically a reinforced battalion, never suffered such a hit that would excuse the need for retreat form the front-line, neither suffered the humiliating defeats of the Turkish Brigade. Even smaller in size in comparison, someone could claim that the HEF’s contribution to the allied fight, was much bigger than the impact of the Turkish Brigade, a formation that was mostly kept as a reserve of the divisional formation to which it was assigned.

The Greek Battalion, was distinguished from the first moment in the battlefield. Its first engagement in a battle, in January 1951 for the defense of Hill 381, was revealing since the Greeks contained much bigger Chinese forces, fighting exemplary and without any irregularity. It is also a fact that many times the American command to which the Greek Battalion was assigned, having appreciated the Hellenic superior level, was assigning to them the most difficult tasks of an attack attempt or the defense of the most vital sector of the defense line.

It is finally characteristic that the reputation of the Greek soldiers was known even to the enemy, up to the point that in June 1953 to abort a large scale Chinese attack for the continuation of the effort to recapture the vital Out Post Harry, whose defense was assigned at the last stage to the Greek Battalion. Also, it is totally revealing the fact that in the last phase of war in July 1953, just a few hours before the application of the ceasing fire agreement, the Chinese in an act of revenge, bombed with great artillery impetus the defense positions of the Greek Battalion!

The Greek soldiers in Korea formed with their unit, a reliable frontline force, absolutely capable for executing both attack and defense missions. In the other hand, the Turkish Brigade after their first disaster in the battlefield, was mostly used as reserve force of the division to which it was attached and to attack only if there was almost no other choice.

Despite this we see that the influence of the Turkish myth created at that time, still exists mostly in Americans. Such a typical example, lies in Admiral William J. Crowe that served in the period 1980-1983 as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) of NATO. From this position, the Admiral had the opportunity to meet both the Hellenic and the Turkish Staff, but as every American officer assumptioning of such duties, his thoughts and considerations were in a large portion clearly political. Therefore, as an excellent candidate “victim” of the Turkish myth, he could not do otherwise but repeating the same baseless stories in his memoirs, indicating usual and completely unimportant facts, that in reality do not mean anything: “The Turks have a distinguished military background. In the early Ottoman days they were the terror of the world. They not only won the great battles of history. As soldiers they were awe-inspiring. That was when they were at the peak of their power, of course, but the modern Turkish Army has inherited the tradition and is intensely proud of it. Every officer knows the nation’s military record in detail, right down to the Korean War, where they also had an outstanding record. General Necdet Oztorun, the deputy chief of staff, who served in Korea, often chided me about how his unit had saved an American company from defeat.

As a NATO commander I might not have been able to get the Turks to cooperate with Greeks, but at least I knew I could count on their discipline and bravery. In battle, they would do what they were told to. The other side of the coin was that Turkish military thinking was highly stylized. Initiative did not extend down the ranks.

But there was never a question that they would fight tenaciously. The Turks have never hesitated to take casualties. It is embedded in their souls and in their history. On the Gallipoli peninsula in World War One they rushed the Allied trenches time and again. They lost hundreds of thousands of men, but they kept coming. My instincts tell me that in the open field in this day of tanks and maneuver they would be strenuously tested. But if they were able to take a stand, they would be very difficult to uproot.

I am persuaded that the Greeks too would fight extremely well. It is a small military organization but with considerable punch for its size. Moreover, Greek troops are canny and natural scrappers. I never had any doubts about their staunchness, and I was convinced that if we ever had been confronted with Soviet and Warsaw Pact aggression much of the Greek-Turkish animosity would have disappeared – at least temporarily”.(2

Having examined the conditions under which the Turkish myth was created during the Korean War, the poor war achievements there, their action in Cyprus and today in Kurdistan, someone can proceed in the extraction of more established conclusions. The basic conclusion is that the Turkish Army, proved in fact what the Turkish word “asker” (mob) describes: a barbarian mass of butchers, capable of exercising all its “force” to weak and defenseless people, but who surrenders in the sight of a strong resistance, from a determined opponent. The Turkish savageness in the modern battlefields (Cyprus, Kurdistan) took place against non-combatants regardless of age or sex, which along with prisoners were slaughtered without distinctions. On the other side, wherever there is an organized and strong resistance, the Turkish progress is not existing and their defeat seems certain.

Notes:

1)       Thomas Nigel/ Abbott Peter/ Mike Chappel, The Korean War 1950-53, Osprey 1986, p. 21.

2)        Ntokos Thanos/ Protonotarios Nikos, The Turkish military power. A challenge for the Hellenic National security, Konstantinos Tourikis Publications 1994, p. 49.

3)       Stokesbury James, A short history of the Korean War, 1988, p. 238.

4)       Stokesbury James, A short history of the Korean War, 1988, p. 299.

5)       Clay Blair, The forgotten war. America in Korea 1950-1953, New York Times books 1987, p. 451.

6)       Clay Blair, The forgotten war. America in Korea 1950-1953, New York Times books 1987, p. 451.

7)       Robert Leckie, Conflict: The history of the Korean War 1950-1953, G.P. Putham’s Sons 1962, p. 202, 203.

8)       Hellenic Army General Staff/ Military History Directorate, The Hellenic Expeditionary Force in Korea 1950-1955, Athens 1977, p. 18.

9)        Raymond Cartier, The Afterwar World History, Volume A 1945-1953, Papyrus/Parismatch 1970.

1   Clay Blair, The forgotten war. America in Korea 1950-1953, New York Times books 1987, p. 452.

11)   Clay Blair, The forgotten war. America in Korea 1950-1953, New York Times books 1987, p. 455.

12)   Clay Blair, The forgotten war. America in Korea 1950-1953, New York Times books 1987, p. 455.

13)   Russel Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China’s undeclared war against the US in Korea, Newmarket Press 1988, p. 192.

14)   Clay Blair, The forgotten war. America in Korea 1950-1953, New York Times books 1987, p. 657.

15)   Harry G. Summers, Colonel US Army (Ret), Korean War Almanac, New York 1990, p. 280.

16)   Thomas Nigel/ Abbott Peter/ Mike Chappel, The Korean War 1950-53, Osprey 1986, p. 21.

17)   Clay Blair, The forgotten war. America in Korea 1950-1953, New York Times books 1987, p. 826.

18)   Max Hastings, The Korean War, Pan Macmillan, New York 1987, p. 328.

19)   Anthony Farrar, The edge of the sword, 1954, p. 246.

2   Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr, The line of fire, Simon & Schuster-1993, p. 91, 92.

   
Bibliography

·         Antony Farrar, The edge of the sword, 1954.

·         Robert Leckie, Conflict: The history of the Korean War 1950-1953, GP Putham’s Sons 1962.

·         Raymond Cartier, The Afterwar World History, Volume A 1945-1953, Papyrus/Parismatch 1970.

·         Hellenic Army General Staff / Military History Directorate, The Hellenic Expeditionary Force in Korea 1950-1955,  Athens 1977.

·         Nigel Thomas, Peter Abbott, Mike Chappell, The Korean War 1950-53, Osprey 1986.

·         Clay Blair, The forgotten war. America in Korea 1950-1953, New York Times books 1987.

·         Russel Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China’s undeclared war against the US in Korea, Newmarket Press 1988.

·         James L. Stokesbury, A short history of the Korean War, 1988.

·         Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr, The line of fire, Simon & Schuster 1993.

·         Thanos Ntokos & Nikos Protonotarios, The Turkish military power. A challenge for the Hellenic National security, Konstantinos Tourikis Publications 1994.

and real images of what the army looked like.........

http://www.doureios.com/magazine/TurksInKorea.html

The Korean War Memorial in Washington DC is not to commemorate the Turkish army but the US army during the Korean War, know as the forgotten war.

The Korean War Veterans Memorial is located near the Lincoln Memorial on the National Mall in Washington, D.C. It was dedicated on July 27, 1995. The memorial commemorates the sacrifices of the 5.8 million Americans who served in the U.S. armed services during the three-year period of the Korean War. From June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953, 54,246 Americans died in support of their country. Of these, 8,200 are listed as missing in action, or lost or buried at sea. In addition 103,284 were wounded during the conflict. As an integral part of the memorial, the Korean War Honor Roll was established, honoring those U.S. military personnel who died worldwide during the war.

The 19 stainless steel statues were sculpted by Frank Gaylord of Barre, Vt. and cast by Tallix Foundries of Beacon, N.Y. They are approximately 7-feet tall and represent an ethnic cross section of America. The advance party has 14 Army, three Marine, one Navy and one Air Force members. The statues stand in patches of juniper bushes and are separated by polished granite strips, which give a semblance of order and symbolize the rice paddies of Korea. The troops wear ponchos covering their weapons and equipment. The ponchos seem to blow in the cold winds of Korea.

Now depending on the countries that were involved in the Korean war, they will have in their own war a memorial for it or not.

...and the uniforms are representattive of the uniforms worn by the US soldiers of the Korean war which is pretty close to the same type of uniforms worn during WW2.

I still stand by saying anything to honor soldiers and war sucks big time. I don´t care what side the perpetrators or the victums. No country is truly free, because war is profitable.

Killing is profitable and the USA likes to stir up shit everywhere because they make money from it.

Sales for the world´s 100 largest arms producers amounted to $411 billion in 2010, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. That was up 1% from the year before, a modest rise that was held in check by the drawdown of foreign forces in Iraq.

Military budgets have been largely unaffected by the economic downturn, said Susan Jackson of SIPRI, a peace research group.

Since 2002, arms sales among the 100 largest providers of military equipment and services have increased 60%, SIPRI said in a release last month.

The 10 biggest arms producers accounted for more than half of the 2010 sales. The composition of those sales reflects the state of modern warfare, as battles are now often fought with remote surveillance and air strikes instead of ground combat.

Of the 100 companies on the list, 44 are based in the United States. Sales by the U.S. companies accounted for more than 60% of arms sales revenue in 2010.

The top seven U.S. arms producers are also among Uncle Sam´s 10 biggest contractors.

Then this means you spit on the soldiers who fought during the war of 1812 and defended your country from becoming another American state.

Keep in mind that many of those soldiers who fought were fighting for an idiologie and a country.

If Attaturk did not think that his country could be better he would not have fought for his convictions and Turky would still be under religious rule.

So what do we do?  Sit back and watch terranic zealots take over the world?

The exerp from the book Soldiers is the story of a soldier who fought side by side with Turkish soldiers and who was impressed by their courage and fervor.

Now it is very easy to judge actions of the past but keep in mind that in many countries, if it were not for soldiers fighting for their freedom and liberty.  The freedom of speech that many take for granted would not exists.

First because we have a TC protocol to not say anything slanderous to you I will say the remark in itself is stupid, corrupt and immoral and way off key and should embarass you. No where did I say anything about spitting and for you to get that idea only shows your remarkable level of intellect.

enough said on that part.

First what I think or feel regarding my country has nothing to do with TC. But I will say I did 2 tours in Kandahar Afghanistan to comply with RCAF. It was stupid and immoral to enter another country this way.
All wars are profitable...................except for those
that fight them ( soldier )

War is great business. You play on fear to get money. You build billions of dollars worth of stuff that gets destroyed and needs to replaced. The fact that millions of people suffer is not your concern. Your only obligation is to make a profit.

As far as the war of 1812, I guess we should of let them capture and keep montreal and the land of quebec.

To understand the conflict that led to the War of 1812 we must begin with the Treaty of 1783 that ended the War of Independence. The treaty was deliberately generous to the Americans. Recognizing their independence was a military necessity that other clauses, especially the transfer of the territory between the Appalachians and the Ohio River to the United States ignored the interests of the First Nations who had fought for the British and the Québec-based fur traders. The British Prime Minister, Lord Shelburne’s was convinced that the British Empire would best be served by free trade and harmonious relations with the United States. A peace treaty that gave Americans everything they could wish for would guarantee good relations and prosperity for Britain within an informal “empire.”

read your history before you remark.

Most soldiers even today have no clue as to why they go to another country to fight a war. They are either being paid to be stupid and obey or forced to be in the army.. Most soldiers are mostly uneducated, young and impressionable. The reason why so many joined the US forces was to be paid ( room, board shelter and training ) , get some money, hopefully some respect which often fell on deaf ears when they returned. It was a way to better themselves or so they thought. Now the USA has a huge amount of young undereducated PTSD members with the knowledge of how to kill. Great.... Many other countries are quietly battling with this too.

No one wins in war....